

## **“Open” Disclosure of Innovations, Incentives and Follow-on Reuse:**

Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field Experiment in Computational  
Biology

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### Abstract:

Most of society's innovation systems--academic science, the patent system, open source, etc.--are “open” in the sense that they are designed to facilitate knowledge disclosure among innovators. An essential difference across innovation systems is whether disclosure is of intermediate progress and solutions or of completed innovations. We present experimental evidence that links intermediate versus final disclosure not just with quantitative tradeoffs that shape the rate of innovation, but with transformation of the very nature of the innovation search process. We find intermediate disclosure has the advantage of efficiently steering development towards improving existing solution approaches, but also the effect of limiting experimentation and narrowing technological search. We discuss the comparative advantages of intermediate versus final disclosure policies in fostering innovation.

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**Abstract**

Most of society’s innovation systems—academic science, the patent system, open source, etc.—are “open” in the sense that they are designed to facilitate knowledge disclosure among innovators. An essential *difference* across innovation systems is whether disclosure is of intermediate progress and solutions or of completed innovations. We present experimental evidence that links intermediate versus final disclosure not just with quantitative tradeoffs that shape the rate of innovation, but with transformation of the very nature of the innovation search process. We find intermediate disclosure has the advantage of efficiently steering development towards improving existing solution approaches, but also the effect of limiting experimentation and narrowing technological search. We discuss the comparative advantages of intermediate versus final disclosure policies in fostering innovation.

## 1 Introduction

How do disclosure policies that govern the reuse of knowledge, technology and innovations, once developed, affect the rate and direction of inventive activity? Consider, for example, the implementation of the “Bermuda Principles” by the Human Genome Project (HGP). In return for stable, guaranteed funding, more than one thousand research scientists representing more than 30 research laboratories in at least 19 countries released all of their sequence data into the public domain within 24 hours of discovery (Contreras, 2011). Conducted over a thirteen-year period, the HGP was one of the most ambitious, large-scale, scientific efforts in modern times. This process of near instantaneous disclosure of findings and methods, intended to enable investigators to build on each others’ results and coordinate in order to more rapidly advance the frontiers of scientific knowledge, yielded the structure of the human genome. This immediate disclosure and public sharing of scientific results (sequences) was a significant departure from the usual academic practice of releasing results and analyses in the form of a published scientific journal article. (These data outputs would later be used in more typical scientific publications down the road). It was also in stark contrast to the patenting and contracting strategy pursued by Celera, the for-profit firm that was racing against the HGP consortium.

As the example illustrates, there is a range of institutions or frameworks in which innovation can be governed, including the patent system, academic science, open source frameworks, the variety of idiosyncratic contracted frameworks in the human genome example and so on (Table 1). Each framework or innovation system treats knowledge and technology disclosures (e.g., sharing, spillovers, transfers and reuse more generally) according to its own particular rules and procedures (Table 1). Rather than focus on the many details of disclosure policies within a given innovation system, this paper considers an essential difference across innovation systems: *final* versus *intermediate* disclosure policies. Here, we investigate how final and intermediate disclosure policies—this key difference distinguishing innovation systems—shapes innovation. Thus, we attempt to better understand the comparative advantages of these approaches and the innovation systems that embody them.

Traditional institutions tend to favor final disclosure of an innovation or problem-solving output that is completed or “working,” i.e. after the innovation-related problem solving process is completed, such as patented inventions, working instantiations of designs in product components or machinery used in larger downstream systems, vetted academic contributions in the form of published journal articles, artistic or compositional products in some integral form and so on (Table 1). Intermediate and final disclosure are distinguished in the first instance by *timing*. Whereas final disclosures necessarily occur upon (and often considerably *after*) the completion of work, intermediate disclosure occurs continuously. Disclosure is further distinguished by *form*. Final disclosures, by their definition, typically involve some standardized, integral, working and wholly resolved form of solution. By contrast, intermediate disclosure can accommodate a greater breadth or smaller quanta of knowledge, as in partial and negative results, methods, data, progress and so forth.

We argue and test two main points. First, we argue that more readily promoting knowledge reuse through intermediate disclosure comes with the cost of diminished incentives, depressing effort and participation—an “incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff. We clarify that this tradeoff is rooted in the timing, form and contractibility of technology and knowledge reuse. Second, intermediate and final disclosure policies produce a qualitative transformation in patterns and scope of “search” across different approaches to addressing an innovation problem—both in terms of choices by individual innovators and overall patterns in the population of innovators. Final disclosure promotes greater independent, “parallel” or uncorrelated experimentation across different innovators (Nelson,

1961; Abernathy and Rosenbloom, 1969; Boudreau et al., 2011); intermediate disclosure produces more coordinated—and possibly convergent and overlapping—choices of solution approaches. These differences are shaped by the prospect of reducing cost and uncertainty in experimentation and by greater signaling (regarding the knowledge frontier and the actions of others) under intermediate disclosure.

Whereas, within the economy, intermediate and final disclosure are associated with entirely different innovation systems, our empirical investigation makes inferences by varying the disclosure policy while holding other features of institutional design constant. To do so, we implemented a field experiment in a controlled, “synthetic” institutional environment. We implemented the experiment on an online platform that was built and customized to incorporate key research design features by TopCoder (a leading developer of contest-based custom software and algorithm solutions).

The design involved comparing randomly-assigned independent groups of individuals working to develop and optimize a bioinformatics algorithm under either disclosure regime. In all, 733 mathematicians, software developers, scientists and data scientists participated over the two-week problem-solving period. Under intermediate disclosure, intermediate solutions developed in the regular trial-and-error development process were instantaneously catalogued and made available for inspection and reuse by other participants within the group. Under final disclosure, intermediate solutions were not disclosed until the end of the two-week development period. Payoffs and rewards were on the basis of rank order of solution performance within each independent group. We observe fine-grained measures of incentives and effort, solution approaches and the technical performance of solutions.

It should be emphasized that the experimental design is intended to reflect a *population* of prospective innovators and how they respond to the prospect of working under a given institutional framework. This creates the need for unusually large comparison groups to be constructed from the 733 participants. A direct consequence and cost of this requirement is minimal replication in the design. We discuss this point at greater length herein. A second point deserving special emphasis is the research is intended to generalize insights in relation to a wide range of innovation systems on the basis of the one (synthetic) institutional context presented here. Therefore, we caution that while the intermediate disclosure regime produces higher quality problem-solving at lower cost in this particular context, this is not a generalizable finding. The key generalizable insights reside in

the tradeoffs we document.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we establish key terms of reference with respect to disclosure policies in innovation systems. In Section 3, we review related literature and develop predictions. The experimental set-up, methods and data collection are described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents results and analysis. Section 7 concludes.

<Table 1>

## 2 The Role of Disclosure Policies in Innovation

In this section, we establish our key terms of reference, first discussing the cumulative innovation process and then defining questions of disclosure more precisely.

### 2.1 “Upstream” Knowledge and “Downstream” Reuse

Scholarship in a range of disciplines has conceived of innovation as a cumulative process whereby the frontiers of knowledge and production possibilities are advanced by successfully solving a series of problems (Kuhn, 1962; Sahal, 1985). In large part, new knowledge, innovation and technical advances are products of a recombinatorial process (e.g. Weitzman, 1998; Fleming, 2001), where existing “upstream” knowledge is built upon and recombined within an on-going stream of cumulative innovations, including those that improve upon the original application and perhaps others that open up new uses (Basalla, 1988). In academic science, for example, this takes the form of new advances building upon and citing existing publications, presentations and exchanges in meetings and seminars, etc. (Dasgupta and David, 1994). In industrial innovation, for example, competitors may learn from and draw on the knowledge and technology of other firms through some combination of licensing, involuntary knowledge spillovers, movement of employees and so forth (e.g., Marx et al., 2009; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) . Similarly, various instantiations of open innovation systems rely on participants being able, in their attempts to solve current problems and create new inventions, to reuse prior contributors’ knowledge and technology (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 2005).

## 2.2 Disclosure, Granting Access and Devolving Control

Where innovating individuals or organizations possess distinct comparative advantages, it will sometimes be productive to involve multiple parties to innovate within the chain of cumulative innovation (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). Therefore, central to cumulative innovation is a need for upstream knowledge and technology to be disclosed in order for downstream innovators to reuse and build upon this work.

Our use of “disclosure” here should be understood as shorthand for the idea of implementing a broader framework<sup>1</sup> in which upstream knowledge and technology are not just disclosed but follow-on innovators are also *granted access* rights (Murray and O’Mahony, 2007; Boudreau, 2010). For example, patents disclose the designs of inventions in the public domain. But patents also confer rights of exclusion to the patent owner; it is through licensing that access is granted for reuse by downstream innovators. Imperfect defensibility of patents can also lead to *de facto* access through “leakage” and involuntary spillovers of knowledge. Analogously, “user innovation” requires that originating technologies and ideas not only be disclosed, but also that users have rights of access and reuse, typically via the “first-sale doctrine” (Katz, 2014), which grants inventors rights to adapt, change and modify existing products without legal encumbrances. Furthermore, beyond providing access via a contractual framework, in the case of physical materials there can be a need for investments in facilities and infrastructure to enable transfer and downstream reuse (Stern, 2004; Furman and Stern, 2011).

Disclosures and access typically impose certain conditions and stipulations, include those related to use, sharing, further development, modification and commercialization (e.g.: Gans and Murray, 2012). Stipulations may concern issues such as payments, attribution, responsibilities and restrictions of various kinds. Wholly devolving control rights over upstream knowledge or technology may eliminate such restrictions and conditionality (Boudreau, 2010). Wholesale devolution of control rights, however, is rare. Even in the case of open source software, rights of access and reuse are only established by acceding to the General Public License or like agreements, which place a great number of conditions on sharing, further development, modification and commercialization (Raymond, 1999).

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<sup>1</sup>We focus here on disclosure *policies* rather than strategic, voluntary disclosures by individual actors (e.g., Haeussler et al. (2009), Henkel and Baldwin (2010))

### 2.3 Intermediate versus Final Disclosure Policies

Following earlier premises, we contend that all innovation systems are “open”, if by “open” we mean they enable disclosure of upstream knowledge and technology for reuse. Although endless details distinguish different innovation systems (see Table 1), a categorical distinction can be made between systems implementing *final* and *intermediate disclosure* policies. Intermediate and final disclosure are distinguished in the first instance by *timing*. Whereas final disclosures necessarily occur upon (and often considerably *after*) the completion of work, intermediate disclosures occur more continuously, as progress is made throughout the problem-solving process. Disclosure is further distinguished by *form*. Final disclosures, by their definition, typically involve some standardized, integral, working and wholly resolved form of solution. By contrast, intermediate disclosure can accommodate a greater range and varying quanta of knowledge, as in partial and negative results, methods, data, progress and so forth.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the most common and influential example of intermediate disclosure is open source software, in which code, bug reports and test suites are instantly made available for developers to build upon and reuse in successive submissions to the code base (O’Mahony, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Intermediate disclosure practices have also been implemented in computer hardware (Osterloh and Rota, 2007), Wikipedia (Zhang and Zhu, 2011), synthetic biology (Torrance, 2010), the Polymath Project for creating mathematical proofs (Gowers and Nielsen, 2009) and Netflix’s \$1MM prize contest to improve its movie rating prediction algorithm, in which intermediate solutions were disclosed in the course of the contest. Intermediate disclosure is not just a modern, Internet-driven phenomenon. Ample case examples from the industrial revolution and early 20th century of particular technological advances describe instances of “collective invention” in which inventors making intermediate disclosures to one another of ideas and techniques propelled advances in blast furnace technology (Allen, 1983), Cornish pumping engines, Bessemer steel, large-scale silk production (Nuvolari, 2004) and aviation technology (Meyer, 2013).

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<sup>2</sup>Our consideration of timing here differs from past research on questions of timing and breadth of disclosure (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Mukherjee and Stern, 2009; Lerner, 2006; Moon, 2011; Gans and Murray, 2012) by examining, in particular, effects of disclosures *before* the creation of a final innovation.

### 3 Disclosure Policies and Innovation Outcomes

In this section, we consider how implementing final or intermediate disclosure policies may affect innovation. Our discussion is in two parts. We first describe what we refer to as the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff. We then describe how intermediate versus final disclosure policies qualitatively transform the search process. We develop predictions for the empirical analysis to follow.

#### 3.1 Disclosure Policies, Incentives and Follow-on Reuse

Creating *ex ante* incentives to make costly and risky investments and an effort to realize an innovation while simultaneously encouraging *ex post* or follow-on knowledge reuse (through disclosure) are two goals<sup>3</sup> of any innovation system. (See Scotchmer (2004) and Table 1.) The goals of incentives and reuse can sometimes conflict and other times be complementary in any one system. For example, knowledge spillovers and leakage among competing firms facilitates reuse, but may harm incentives (Scotchmer, 2004). In academic science, greater reuse through citations might, by contrast, stimulate efforts and incentives (Stephan, 1996, 2012). In this subsection, rather than focus on incentives and reuse *within* a given system, we will instead consider how differences in disclosure policies *across* systems bear on innovation outcomes.

**Intermediate Disclosure and Contractibility.** As is well known, contractibility conditions are tenuous around the transfer and reuse of knowledge and ideas (e.g., Arrow, 1971). It is challenging, under the best of circumstances, to assure contractibility in the sense of assuring that disclosure and access conditions are honored and proper rewards conferred to the originating innovator. Managing the challenge of contractibility is arguably so central that key features of the innovation system design (with nuanced rules, laws, procedures and even cultures and customs) can be understood as means of either increasing effectiveness of contractibility or reducing their costs. For example, multi-party exchange frameworks—as in patent pools, academic publishing, standards organizations and biological research centers—avoid the need for *ad hoc* bilateral negotiations and governance. Informal governance can also supplement formal governance in order to enforce rules of reuse and sharing (Fauchart and von Hippel, 2008). Proprietary platform technologies are even designed from

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<sup>3</sup>Other considerations may include allocative interests or fairness and minimizing deadweight losses. Here, however, we emphasize dynamic considerations of technical change and innovation, given our focus here on innovation processes and that such considerations are most central to advancing welfare in society (Solow, 1957).

the ground up in a way that enables access and reuse by large numbers of downstream innovators without the need to relinquish control or transfer knowledge of the inner workings of the platform (Boudreau, 2010; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2010).

Most crucial to our arguments here, the cornerstones of contractability are observability and verifiability (Hart, 1995)—and intermediate disclosures degrade observability and contractibility of knowledge disclosure and reuse. The delicate balance in the design of any innovation system can best function to the extent that upstream knowledge being disclosed, transferred and reused takes some completed, working, wholly integral form—simply because this makes the quantum of knowledge transfer more measurable and standardized. The completed, working and wholly integral nature of final disclosure alleviates challenges of attribution.

Consider the academic science context, where the research article is the commonly accepted and readily observed “unit of innovative output.” Production of research articles is governed by commonly understood requirements for format, content and completeness. These outputs are even certified by the institutions through peer review. Peer review is itself somewhat standardized through a set of regular routines, given standard expectations around the content of research articles. Simple counts of research articles also even act as meaningful measures of journal quality (impact factor as average numbers of citations) and researcher quality (on the basis of publication counts, by journal type). Intermediate disclosure will reduce these levels of observability and verifiability if they imply less standardized, less measurable, less certified, more commingled, more varied forms and proper attribution is made more difficult.

**The “Incentives-versus-Reuse” Tradeoff.** In considering how incentives and reuse are affected by disclosure policies, prior research has tended to consider these issues separately, rather than at once; and this research also tends to consider these issues within a given innovation system, rather than in relation to different approaches to disclosure across altogether different systems. (See Appendix for further description and mapping of the existing research that we build upon.) Here, we define an “incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff associated with intermediate and final disclosure.

With respect to incentives, intermediate disclosure reduces contractibility, as earlier described, reducing upstream innovators’ ability to impose conditions and stipulations on reuse. This includes stipulations assuring recognition and rewards to the upstream innovator. Intermediate disclosure

therefore reduces incentives, all else being equal.<sup>4</sup> This claim is consistent with the popular view that the absence of patents (a final disclosure mechanism) might decrease incentives (Schankermann, 1998), which enjoys at least some empirical support (Belleflamme, 2006). Note, this lower contractibility adds to what might already be depressed incentives under any form of reuse—based on either intermediate *or* final disclosure—with “profit-division”-related losses of incentives that occur under any form of disclosure, where dividing payoffs between upstream and downstream innovators can itself harm incentives (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer, 2004).

Implications for follow-on reuse between final and intermediate disclosure are more straightforward. Intermediate disclosure—by definition—creates the opportunity for earlier, more frequent and wider ranging disclosures, with fewer restrictions on reuse than does final disclosure.<sup>5</sup> It immediately follows that intermediate disclosure enables greater reuse of a given upstream innovation, all else being equal.<sup>6</sup>

As straightforward as the logic of the “reuse” half of the “incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff might be—i.e., all else being equal, removing obstacles to disclosure indeed enables greater reuse—it remains difficult to directly observe relevant all-else-being-equal empirical comparisons to illustrate this point and to assess magnitudes of effects. That said, we can begin to appreciate the central role of follow-on innovation and reuse under intermediate disclosure simply by referring to the numerous studies documenting their abundance in contexts such as open source software projects (e.g.: von Krogh et al., 2003), communities of inventors (e.g. Meyer 2013), user innovator groups (e.g., von Hippel,

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<sup>4</sup>This presumes, for example, that lower appropriability is not somehow outweighed by benefits of wider adoption and reuse by competing innovators, as with say network effects (e.g., Cusumano et al., 1992), powerful complementarities and increasing returns in knowledge recombination(Weitzman, 1998; Bessen and Maskin, 2004; Belenzon, 2012) or the establishment of a cooperative reciprocating or “sharing” equilibrium among those disclosing and recombining knowledge (e.g., Allen, 1983).

<sup>5</sup>Note that these arguments imply that contractibility is “good” for upstream innovators but “bad” for downstream reuse. This might seem a departure from Coasian reasoning, where the assignment of property rights and ability to write contracts can assure efficient trades. However, even if a perfect contract for the transfer and reuse *could* be written, the downstream innovator might not be able to commit to the contract without first engaging in trial-and-error experimentation to assess the value of an upstream input. Thus, the downstream innovator would need a means of accessing this knowledge prior to assessing its value. Alternatively, under less than ideal Coasian conditions, this contention (of good for upstream incentives and bad for downstream reuse) simply requires that imperfect contracts go some measure towards guaranteeing upstream innovators’ payoffs, while adding transaction costs in downstream reuse relative to what would be the case in a less heavily contracted environment.

<sup>6</sup>The all-else-being-equal qualification is rather important here, as intermediate disclosure could affect incentives in a way that determines whether a given upstream innovation appears in the first place. It should also affect downstream innovator’s incentives to invest in “absorbing” and learning upstream knowledge and technology. Intermediate disclosure could also shape coordination and search costs. For example, a published academic article (a final disclosure) comes with the validation, certification and screening of the peer review process. The selection process of journals and the full development and articulation of contributions in an article also help sort and categorize its content for other scholars to comprehend and situate within the torrent of academic research output.

2005) and other intermediate disclosure regimes.

Although follow-on reuse is taken as a matter of fact in research focused on intermediate disclosure regimes, innovators' incentives to enter, participate and exert effort in development is taken as a "puzzle" given lower appropriability conditions (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Bonacorsi and Rossi, 2004)—consistent again with the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff. In many cases, the puzzle is clarified by pointing to some form of compensating mechanism that countervails any productivity losses from depressed incentives. For example, enlisting "many eyeballs" (Raymond, 1999) through globally distributed reach and highly modular work streams can offset lost incentives in open source software projects. Lower contractibility and payoffs specifically related to disclosures and reuse might also be offset by enlisting sources of motivation not tied to transfers and reuse, such as intrinsic, pro-social, own-use and learning-by-doing motivations (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Roberts et al., 2006). Further, research on open source and user innovation routinely refer to populations of those innovators as "communities" (Franke and Shah, 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; West and Lakhani, 2008), implying norms and socialization might compensate by producing cooperative, reciprocating interactions rather than competitive ones. In some cases, intermediate disclosure regimes still involve attempts to tie payoffs to encourage effort and disclosure, at least for small levels of effort. For example, Wikipedia encourages "edits" (contributions and simultaneous disclosure) via the motivations of participants to signal their expertise to a wider audience of users (Zhang and Zhu, 2011). The small size of individual intermediate, partial contributions might also relieve the need for herculean efforts by any one individual.

Beyond papers focusing on patterns associated with particular disclosure policies, a small stream of recent papers attempts to compare follow-on reuse when disclosure policies vary within a given innovation system. None precisely relates to intermediate versus final disclosure, but nonetheless offers a degree of corroborating insight. For example, several papers have begun to investigate effects of patents, a final disclosure mechanism, on follow-on reuse (relative to no patents, at all). Our theory would predict that patents, as a final disclosure regime, should retard disclosure and reuse of a given upstream innovation all else being equal, relative to rates of reuse in intermediate disclosure. However, rather than simply finding patents generate little reuse, these studies fail to find any evidence whatsoever that patents produce an increase of reuse at all—and most data analyzed thus far suggests a *decrease* (Huang and Murray, 2009; Murray and Stern, 2007; Williams,

2013; Sampat and Williams, 2014).<sup>7</sup> Thus, rather than promoting reuse via property rights and a “market for ideas” (Kitch, 1977; Arora, et al. 2004) at least these existing comparisons suggest imperfections and transaction costs of patents (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Bessen, 2004) that lead them to support fewer disclosures than even our theory would allow for. More broadly, these results corroborate our contention that hindrances and conditions placed on disclosure can have large negative implications for on-going reuse.

Perhaps works that are closest to our reuse “half” of the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, are those by Stern and Furman (2011) and Boudreau (2010). Stern and Furman (2011) show that the establishment of biological resource centers as an infrastructure and contracting framework to grant access to research materials increases reuse by wide margins. Boudreau (2010) analogously shows that both granting access to and devolving control over upstream operating system platforms in PDAs and smartphones accelerates reuse in downstream development sizably increases building of downstream products on top of those platforms.

We summarize the preceding arguments in the following prediction.

**Prediction 1 (“Incentives-versus-Reuse” Tradeoff):** Implementing an intermediate rather than final disclosure policy leads to lower incentives but greater follow-on reuse.

### 3.2 Disclosure Policies and Search for Solutions

The earlier incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff draws on literatures that implicitly conceptualize the innovation process as a “production function” where upstream knowledge or technology serves as an “input” along with effort and investment in determining the level of downstream innovation that results. In this section, we consider that innovation performance is also shaped by the the search for problem-solving approach. We develop predictions in relation to disclosure policies.

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<sup>7</sup>Williams (2013) is exceptional in finding zero effect of patents on disclosure. Her interpretation is that given there is zero effect on disclosure, the effect of patents on reuse can be disregarded in efficiency assessments of patents. Our theory and arguments instead would suggest that the absence of an effect on reuse should instead be regarded as cause to question to efficacy of the disclosure mechanism in patents. It should be noted too that Galasso and Schankermann (2013) find considerable variation from industry to industry, even in their relatively selected subsample of inventions that are invalidated, suggesting considerable need for caution in interpreting the existing evidence.

**Alternative Approaches to Solving Problems.** Innovation problems that involve making large numbers of interacting decisions are, by their nature, complex and uncertain—and therefore require *search* to find a solution (Simon, 1962). For example, in aeronautical engineering, landing gear design involves sets of decisions related to a great many interrelated parameters (e.g., the number and configuration of wheels, gear design, retraction and extension method, etc.) that trade off various performance criteria (e.g., drag, weight, cost, maintenance, reliability, etc.). Analog of such complex innovation and problem-solving exist in science, technology, software, artistic composition, etc.

In principle, there may be multiple solutions that meet some criteria—although perhaps trading off aspects of performance in different ways. Where the individual decisions (around particular parameters of a solution) are complementary and “go together” (Rosenberg, 1982) altogether different solution approaches can exist (e.g., a fixed landing gear goes together with the choice of aerodynamic covers for wheels, whereas a retractable landing gear goes together with modifications to the fuselage). Innovation thus tends to proceed as a search for *approaches* and then as a search for optimal solutions within a given approach. (This is akin to search on different “hills” within a “rugged landscape” (Kaufmann, 1993; Levinthal, 1997), or “exploration versus exploitation” (March, 1991)). In the history of aeronautical design, landing gear design proceeded in at least four distinct and parallel approaches until finally the retractable landing became the preferred approach (Vincenzi, 1994). Landing gear design proceeds today within that same basic approach, with continuing incremental improvements.<sup>8</sup> This notion of search is explored in a range of research traditions beyond just innovation, including artificial intelligence, psychology, biology, evolution, organizational learning and others (e.g., Baron, 1988; Cyert and March, 1963; Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon, 1962; March, 1991; Levinthal, 1997).

To the extent that innovation and problem solving is shrouded in uncertainty, individual problem solvers may initiate search according to their own initial stock of knowledge and beliefs (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Rosekopf and Almeida, 2003). Trial-and-error experimentation then provides feedback and insight—learning—accumulating upon an innovator’s initial stock of knowledge. Given constraints of uncertainty and bounded rationality, the choice of search direction can be influenced by

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<sup>8</sup>Bijker et al. (1987) document multiple simultaneous approaches in a range of technologies including bicycles, synthetic dye chemistry and ship-building.

some combination of heuristics (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982), theoretical understandings (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), analogies from comparable situations (Gavetti et al., 2005) and the problem solver’s own initial endowment of knowledge and experience. In addition, problem solvers may not be entirely isolated, autonomous and independent of one another. They may and often are, searching whilst others do the same. This provides an opportunity to observe the activities and outcomes of the experimentation of other problem solvers. Depending on the payoff structure, observing others’ action can also influence expected returns of making investments in given directions.

**Disclosure and Innovative Search.** The earlier incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, on its own, suggests that the higher incentives of final disclosure might be associated with higher experimentation—inasmuch as higher incentives and effort translate to greater search efforts. Here we argue that disclosure policies should more fundamentally transform patterns of search.

There will be a greater degree of independence in the choice of search approach across innovators under final disclosure, where a steady stream of intermediate updating and observation of others’ actions and choices is not possible. At the population level, this may imply some degree of “parallel” or uncorrelated search, inasmuch as individuals maintain some level of ignorance regarding outcomes of each other’s trial-and-error search process (Nelson, 1961; Abernathy and Rosenbloom, 1969; Boudreau et al., 2011).

In the case of intermediate disclosures, a steadier stream of updates has the potential to result in far more “coordinated” or correlated responses, if individual problem solvers can observe and respond systematically to their own experimentation outcomes and to those of others. Intermediate disclosure, not only increases the immediacy and extent of transfers and reuse, but also telegraphs information about the existence and potential of alternative approaches. More informed and coordinated searching could potentially produce deliberately *differentiated* search paths, as when competing innovators expect higher returns from staking out new ground than from engaging in overlapping experiments (cf. Murray, et al. 2009; Acemoglu, 2012). Following this argument, it is possible that a coordinated search could lead to greater diversity in solution approaches than that generated by independent experimentation. However, a countervailing argument, is that converging on established solution approaches economizes search costs and reduces uncertainty-creating incentives to replicate what has been done. Following the weight of historical evidence—indicating

a general tendency to convergent trajectories, dominant designs and the emergence of scientific paradigms (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Dosi, 1982), we make the following prediction:

**Prediction 2 (“Independent-versus-Convergent Search”):** Implementing an intermediate rather than final disclosure policy leads innovators to tend to converge towards successful solution approaches and to engage in a lesser degree of independent experimentation.

## 4 Experimental Design

In this experiment, we implement a synthetic innovation system in a “Petri dish,” applying different disclosure policies in different treatments. At the same time, we hold constant the problem addressed and the composition and number of participants working under different treatments so as to infer *ceteris paribus* effects of disclosure policies.

The research question and our objectives place relatively high restrictions on the research context. We needed an exceptionally highly-controlled environment that would enable us to precisely implement distinct disclosure policies while controlling all other aspects of the institutional context and observing relevant micro-measures (i.e., effort, problem-solving performance and the particular solution approaches pursued). The experiment was carried out over two weeks on the online software development platform of TopCoder, the leading platform for developing software and algorithmic solutions as a series of contests. The platform has existing communications and payment systems and a membership of elite software and algorithm problem-solvers. We worked closely with TopCoder executives and technologists to modify the platform to implement the features of the experimental design, the particulars of which we describe here.

### 4.1 Sign-up Phase and Random Assignment to Independent Groups

Subjects were recruited from the TopCoder platform’s existing membership of software and algorithm programmers, the experiment being included as part of the regular stream of listed “challenges” members can sign up for and participate in. The posting indicated that the challenge would

feature an algorithmic optimization solution related to genomics, the solution to which was sought by Harvard Medical School (from which the problem had been sourced, see Section 4.2), that the total prize pool would be \$6,000.00 and that the exercise was also being used for research purposes. The call for participation did not describe what particular problem would be solved.

In response to our call for participation, 733 TopCoder members signed up for the experiment. Roughly half (44%) were professionals, the remainder were students. Participants from India (20%), the United States (16%), China (9%) and Russia (9%) accounted for more than half of a pool that represented 69 countries. Intermediate Disclosure was assigned 245 treatments; Final Disclosure and Mixed treatments were each assigned 244 subjects.

Our primary goal in the experiment was to observe differences not only across individuals working under different disclosure policies, but also differences across the groups, as a whole. For example, patterns of learning and innovation in each group is a collective outcome, at least as much as it is can be regarded at the individual level. In this sense, it was important to design an environment—synthetic as it might be—that would represent a *population* of creative problem-solvers could, in the presence of a given institutional framework, might elect to participate in the innovation process or otherwise devote their attention to outside options (much like the case in our real-world innovation systems). This, however, implies the need to create large comparison groups of prospective entrants, to enable us to observe entry, non-entry and the consequences of interactions among individual subjects who do enter and actively participate.

With these points in mind, we constructed a minimum—only two—main experimental comparison groups to maximize their size: the “Intermediate Disclosure” and “Final Disclosure” regimes. A cost of large groups is a loss of replication, with just one trial per treatment. As a means of providing greater validation to the results, we constructed a third, supplementary regime to better assure that our main comparison groups were not somehow eccentric. In this “Mixed” regime, intermediate disclosure was permitted in the second but not the first week of the experiment. In reporting results, we focus on the main comparison groups and return to the Mixed regime to find they corroborate main results.

In creating three equally-sized, independent groups of similar composition, we randomized, but simultaneously matched on skills by rank-ordering participants according to skill-ratings and then randomly assigned descending triplets of roughly equal skill ratings. We are able to observe skills,

as the TopCoder platform provides participants' skill ratings, formulated via an Elo-based system (Maas and Wagenmakers, 2005). This rating estimates skill on the basis of historical performance in similar algorithmic problem-solving exercises.<sup>9</sup>

## 4.2 Problem-Solving and Development Phase

All development and interaction occurred on the online platform. Once assignment of individuals was completed and problem-solving was set to begin, a series of information was immediately revealed. Subjects were given the problem statement, together with a description of how solution accuracy and speed would translate into quantitative solution scores (Appendix A). At the same time, the identities ("handles") of all other subjects in the same treatment group were revealed.

**The Problem.** The innovation problem was to develop *de novo* solutions in computer code to a problem sourced from researchers at Harvard Medical School, specifically, to design a bioinformatics algorithm to compare and annotate a large series of genomic sequences. The problem involved processing large amounts of data, accurately annotating the sequencing while minimizing transcription errors, solving within constrained computational resources (utilizing only an off-the-shelf computer) and minimizing the amount of time. A detailed description of scientific features of the problem and scoring of solutions is described by Lakhani et al. (2013 a).

The problem we selected sits at the intersection of software development, mathematics, computer science and biology, is nontrivial and challenging and is a sort of computational optimization problem that involves iterative solution development and ongoing incremental gains rather than a final analytical solution that is either correct or incorrect. The focus on algorithm development enables us to treat intermediate solutions as primary inputs to subsequent development within a trial-and-error learning process. Working in digital format also enables solutions to be codified and recorded in computer instructions and evaluated by an automated system. The algorithmic setting also enabled us to devise a common, automated and precise measure of quality. Such advantages would not be possible were we to use a non-digital context. Further, the specific problem is highly salient in the scientific literature, having first been addressed when gene sequencing got underway (Altschul et

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<sup>9</sup>The average participant had engaged in dozens of problems prior to the experiment. The Elo system is standard in a range of contexts from chess grandmaster tournaments to US College Bowl systems to the National Scrabble Association and European Go Federation.

al., 1990). More generally, the problem is also representative of complex, data-intensive numerical optimization problems.

**Work Environment, Scoring and Information.** Subjects worked through the platform’s “heads-up” interface screen on which development could be performed in a range of computer languages. Subjects received direct feedback by submitting their algorithm designs to the platform for assessment by the automated test suite and observing solution scores. (It was not possible to receive direct feedback on the quality of submissions “off line.”) The main task required subjects to write code to maximize accuracy and minimize time in identifying the originating gene segments that formed a particular genomic sequence (see Lakhani et al., 2013 a for a detailed description of the problem and scoring). Each code submission had to evaluate 100,000 genomic sequences with the quality score determined as a linear combination of speed and accuracy. Although the explicit scoring model was shared with participants, practically speaking, it was only through submitting intermediate working solutions to the platform in trial-and-error fashion that participants could determine their scores and whether improvements could be made.

#### 4.2.1 Disclosure Regimes

The differences of central interest are those related to the disclosure policies that were implemented across the independent groups. Subjects were informed of procedures within their respective regimes, but not of procedures of other groups or that there would be differences across groups.

**Final Disclosure.** Final Disclosure is the simplest case. No communications or sharing facilities were enabled on the platform for this treatment. Individuals were also instructed that interacting with other competitors off the platform would result in immediate disqualification of all involved. Participants simply worked on their own and submitted their solutions for scoring. Although solutions were not disclosed, we followed TopCoder’s insistence that the system display scores and rank ordering of participants throughout the experiment.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>This creates the possibility of updating and consequent decision-making throughout the contest. However, the experiment was not designed to derive inferences in relation to any dynamic adjustments. We focus on cross-sectional comparisons.

**Intermediate Disclosure.** In Intermediate Disclosure all solutions submitted by subjects in the trial-and-error development process were immediately disclosed to other participants in the same treatment group. This was done via the same main “heads-up” display interface used to conduct software development. All submitted intermediate solutions, identified by score, submitter and time of submission, were listed and available to participants in their entirety (i.e., source code) by simply clicking on the relevant entry in the list. The implemented system of disclosure should thus be understood as relatively simple and frictionless.

**Mixed Regime.** In the Mixed regime, intended to supplement our main comparisons, the first week followed the rules and procedures of Final Disclosure (i.e., no disclosures), the second week followed the rules and procedures of Intermediate Disclosure (i.e., all solutions from the first week was revealed along with any subsequent solutions during the second week).

### 4.3 Payoffs and Rewards Phase

Our primary interest in this experiment is to examine effects of variation in disclosure policies, nonetheless we define a fixed underlying institutional design held constant across treatments. Particularly relevant is, of course, the payoff structure.

**Payoffs in Final Disclosure.** Payoffs were tied to quality of the solutions developed, based on the precise quantitative scoring enabled by platform submissions. In general, payoffs to an innovation problem can, for example, go to the top performing solutions, as in winner-take-all outcomes. Such is the case where only the very best solution is desired and there is no need for variety of solutions or solution approaches in addressing a particular problem. However, more generally, we often see some returns to more than just one solution for a given problem (e.g., competition in academia, industrial competition, prize contests, etc.). For this reason, we chose an arbitrarily small number (5) of prizes, monotonically varying in size with rank. (We were also encouraged to follow this design by TopCoder executives, on the basis of their experience.) In Final Disclosure, the top five positions were allocated a total of \$1,000 in payoffs (\$500, \$250, \$125, \$75 and \$50) at the end of each of the two weeks, i.e., a total of \$2,000. (The particular amounts were chosen under the advice of TopCoder executives, given the nature of the problem and given our interest in eliciting wide

participation. TopCoder executives also recommended we break up payments over two weeks, rather than confer rewards only at the end, as a means of maintaining engagement and participation across the entire process, enabling us to observe a longer period of experimentation and improvement.<sup>11)</sup> Specifically, payoffs were based upon the final, last submissions made by each subject, each week. Top ranking subjects were also publicly announced on the TopCoder website. Therefore, implicit, reputational payoffs accompanied monetary payoffs.

**Payoffs in Intermediate Disclosure.** In Intermediate Disclosure we created an environment and framework in which both upstream problem-solvers and downstream providers of superior final solutions were conferred payoffs—maintaining the same overall budget as in Final Disclosure (\$1,000 per week). We chose an arbitrary division of payoffs between final solution providers and upstream innovators of one-half. (See Green and Scotchmer (1995) and related for a more complete discussion of the theoretical considerations in allocating shares.) Therefore, in Intermediate Disclosure, the top five ranked solution providers were allocated a total at the end of each week of \$500 (\$250, \$125, \$62.50, \$37.50 and \$25), akin to the Final Disclosure case but half the magnitudes. The remaining payoff budget was allocated to upstream innovators.

In submitting any given solution, downstream innovators were instructed to list solutions they examined (i.e., clicked on through the web interface) and somehow drew upon in improving their own solutions. This involved listing the name of creator of solution that was drawn upon and answering the question of what fraction (percentage) of the solution drew on the identified prior submission. The response of this question had no bearing on payoffs to the downstream innovator (in the instance they would go on to secure one of the top five positions). The sum totals of percentage responses for the identified upstream contributors to the top five ranked solutions were then used to generate a rank order of all upstream innovators. Cash payoffs were then conferred to these upstream innovators in the same magnitudes as the top final solution providers (i.e., \$500, \$250, \$125, \$75 and \$50). This payoff structure therefore implements a framework in which rewards are allocated to high-performing upstream solutions. However, stipulations of downstream use including payoffs and rewards associated with reuse are minimal in a low contractibility environment.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>An alternative design would entail a lump disclosure of all first-week solutions at the end of the first week. However, we elected to implement the simpler design as it did not bear on predictions in Section 3. There is clearly scope for examining more nuanced dynamics in future research.

<sup>12</sup>Note, here we do not generate low contractibility by varying the form of disclosures (see Section 2.3), but rather

Figure 1 summarizes timing and payoffs across the distinct comparison groups.

<Figure 1>

## 5 Data and Variables

The data set we analyze here was constructed from several data sources. First, the experimental setup provides us with observational data subjects' decision to participate and make at least one submission or not, number of submissions, quality of submissions. As a supplementary measure of effort exerted, apart from number of submissions, we also administered a survey after all coding activity was completed and before final results were made public, asking participants to report the number of hours worked over the two-week period. The experimental setup also allowed us to record subjects' clicking through to examine disclosed code submissions of other participants under Intermediate Disclosure. Key variables in the analysis are described in Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables are provided in the analysis to follow.

<Table 2>

We also collected the software code for each submission. From this, we recorded the programming language utilized. Further, we hired three Ph.D. experts to uncover and systematically document the technical solution approaches used in each of the 654 submissions. The experts first reviewed the submissions to infer that across the body of solutions, subsets of distinct combinations of ten elemental computational techniques were used (Table 3). Each solution was then coded according to whether each of these techniques were employed, leading each solution to be encoded as a 10 digit binary code. Across each of the submissions, the experts identified 56 distinct 10-digit combinations or solution approaches. Consistent with the innovation literature's identification of novel approaches as combinations of distinct knowledge sets (Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), unique combinations of methods can be understood to represent distinct approaches to varying degrees, while there is still considerable variation in the particular implementation and quality across individual solutions within a given approach.

<Table 3>

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we directly implement low contractibility in how we define the experimental framework.

## 6 Results and Analysis

Before proceeding to assessing evidence in relation to Predictions 1 and 2, Figure 2 first provides a broad orienting overview of problem-solving patterns in the main comparison groups, showing submissions by quality, over time. The graphs also trace the maximal frontier (black) and moving averages (red) lines. Table 4 provides a broader overview of readily-observable cross-sectional differences between Intermediate Disclosure and Final Disclosure outcomes that we will discuss in greater detail in the discussion to follow.

<Figure 2>

<Table 4>

### 6.1 Findings on the Incentives-versus-Reuse Tradeoff

Results presented in this subsection relate to Prediction 1. We examine evidence in relation to either side of the tradeoff in turn.

**Effort and Incentives.** Evidence of lower levels of participation and effort exerted under Intermediate Disclosure are consistent with our prediction of lower incentives under Intermediate Disclosure, as in Prediction 1. (See “Entry’ Participation and Effort” in Table 4.) The fraction of subjects choosing to “enter” and actively participate in problem-solving (i.e., subjects submitting at least one solution) was significantly—26%—lower in Intermediate Disclosure than in Final Disclosure, with 14% entering and actively participating in Intermediate Disclosure versus 19% in Final Disclosure. Precision and significance of this difference increase when controlling for skill levels and other subject covariates, without altering the point estimate of the difference (not reported).<sup>13</sup>

Those who did participate under Intermediate Disclosure also exerted lower effort, despite facing fewer other active participants as competitors. The number of submissions per participant was 56% lower in Intermediate Disclosure than in Final Disclosure (3.9 versus 6.9 solution submissions, a difference significant at  $p = 1\%$ ). Our other measure of effort—the number of self-reported hours worked over the two weeks (Section 5)—is also lower in Intermediate Disclosure—10.0 versus 14.1

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<sup>13</sup>The data suggests results are driven by “treatment effects” and behaviors rather than “selection effects” and composition. For example, we found no statistical evidence of differences in distributions of skills, industry, areas of technical interest, age and self-reported source of motivation for participating on the platform.

hours, a difference significant at  $p = 1\%$ , based on a 60% response rate. (Precision and significance of these differences again become greater still when controlling for skill level while not changing estimated magnitude of differences.) Therefore apart from considerably more participants entering to engage in problem-solving under Final Disclosure, each active participant also exerts considerably greater effort. In total, Intermediate disclosure produces 99 solution submissions in relation to 319 produced under Final Disclosures.<sup>14</sup> Taken together,<sup>15</sup> we interpret patterns of lower entry and active participation, lower hours worked and lower numbers of submissions as consistent with lower incentives associated with Intermediate Disclosure.

**Reuse of Intermediate Solutions.** Intermediate Disclosure, by definition, enabled intermediate disclosures and reuse whereas Final Disclosure did not. It necessarily follows that the reuse half of the “incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff holds (Section 3.1).

Beyond simply being greater than zero, we find that disclosures and reuse in this environment were widespread and frequent. In total, 30 of the 33 active participants submitting at least one solution in Intermediate Disclosure examined a total of 1,024 intermediate solutions, or 34.1 on average (std. dev. = 28.0). This is consistent with the use of a relatively frictionless (“click-through”) system, an ease of reviewing these intermediate solutions, the focus of all parties on the same problem and thus, an expectation of returns to reviewing intermediate solutions. Early and highest-scoring, solutions elicited the greatest number of examinations. Incidences steadily declined over the two-week duration, with four-fifths of examinations of prior solutions occurring in the first week of the experiment.

It was also the case that many subjects who did not eventually enter and participate also examined solutions, 44, examined intermediate solutions of others. However they examined many fewer 7.3 on average (std. dev. = 8.5). This might be explained in relation to curiosuty or an

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<sup>14</sup>We should qualify this statement by noting that notwithstanding the large differential, even 99 solutions should be regarded as a (very) high number in relation to the level of usual level of attention and publishing around comparable algorithmic problems in genomics in recent decades.

<sup>15</sup>The measure of number of submissions has the appeal of being observational data, whereas hours worked is closest to a direct measure of effort level but is self-reported. The 29% drop in number of hours worked, however, is less susceptible to other factors’ influence than is the 56% drop in numbers of submissions in Intermediate Disclosure. For example, subjects might delay submissions, foregoing a measure of trial-and-error feedback, to limit undesired disclosures. Public disclosure of others’ solutions information regarding the efficacy of different approaches might also reduce the information value of making one’s own submissions, while increasing the information value to simply studying prior solutions. The sharing of information regarding past solutions even to non-entrants might also have shaped decisions to enter either upward or downward, if this further informed their beliefs regarding their possible success. Alternatively, the reuse of prior solutions could facilitate and hasten submissions.

interest in learning. It is also plausible that some of these non-submitters might have decided not to submit upon having reviewed others' solutions.

## 6.2 Findings on Differences in the Innovation Search Process

Results presented in this subsection relate to Prediction 2.

**Performance Patterns and Trajectories.** As a first approach to inferring the nature of search in either regime, we contrast the performance trajectories of individual submitters, as in Figure 3, by connecting the dots representing submissions by the same submitter. Perhaps more than any other figure or table in the paper, this figure reveals the workings of our two main predictions at once in influencing innovation outcomes. (Participants who did not submit solutions do not appear.)

Patterns under Final Disclosure, in the left panel of Figure 3, are inherently the most difficult to read. There are more numerous lines and dots and seemingly more erratic, less regular patterns. The greater number of lines and dots follows the earlier discussion of higher incentives, participation and effort (Section 6.1). Beyond a slight, if not entirely general tendency for individual performance trajectories to increase over time, some start high, others low, at times declining, at times increasing. There is not clear indication of correlated or coincident perturbations across submitters. This results in a high frequency of solutions distributed relatively evenly across the performance spectrum overall and in every time period (Figure 3). These patterns are consistent with independent trial-and-error learning and experimentation occurring under Final Disclosure, as theorized in Section 3.2.

Patterns under Intermediate Disclosure, in the right panel of Figure 3, starkly contrast with those of Final Disclosure. Differences begin with there simply being fewer trajectories and fewer individual submissions. Rather than the up-and-down trajectories of Final Disclosure, we observe laminar, smooth patterns, ascending *together*. Individuals' trajectories (save for those of a handful of low scoring outliers) also cluster on the maximal performance envelope and increasingly do so over time. These patterns are consistent with greater coordinated patterns of learning, experimentation and advance across subjects in a collective process of cumulative innovation. In this, the shape of trajectories suggest also a tendency towards convergence rather than differentiation.

Thus, these patterns documented in Figure 3 are consistent with Prediction 2.

<Figure 3>

**Diversity of Solution Approaches.** An added perspective unto Prediction 2 is provided by data on solution approaches (i.e., combinations of the 10 elemental techniques, see Section 5). These data affirm the earlier suggestion of a greater tendency to coordination in the form of convergence rather than divergence in the case of Intermediate Disclosure.

Fewer solution approaches were tried by the overall group of submitters in Intermediate Disclosure. A total of 19 unique solution approaches were developed under Intermediate Disclosure whereas 27 unique solution approaches were developed under Final Disclosure (i.e., 42% fewer in Intermediate Disclosure). Figure 4 presents the accumulation of distinct solution approaches over time. The lines never cross, indicating there were always a greater number of approaches attempted in Final Disclosure throughout the entire exercise. In Intermediate Disclosure, apart from fewer overall solutions (99 versus 319) and fewer solution approaches (19 versus 27), there were fewer programming languages used. In Intermediate Disclosure, three languages (C#, C++ and Java) were used; in Final Disclosure these languages and two more were used (Python and Visual Basic).

<Figure 4>

It remains possible, nonetheless, that lower levels of experimentation and diversity are simply the result of lower incentives and effort exerted under Intermediate disclosure. It is difficult to entirely rule this possibility out and we should expect this played some sort of role. However, there is evidence consistent with convergence in directions of experimentation. Submitters under Intermediate Disclosure themselves, as individuals experimented across 15% fewer solution approaches than did those in Final Disclosure (1.67 versus 1.96, on average), as in Table 4 under “Solution Approaches”. Given fewer submissions and solution approaches overall in Intermediate Disclosure, we might expect even randomly selected approaches to be less likely to overlap—and to be unique in relation to those used by the wider group. (Consistent with this, each of the 319 solution submissions Final Disclosure each submission has about 8% chance of being unique to the rest of all prior submissions; in the case of the considerably smaller number of submissions under Intermediate Disclosure, 99, sub ) any deliberate attempts to differentiate or even to engage in independent experimentation might then lead to a greater number of unique approaches pursued per submitter under Intermediate Disclosure. However, we find no such evidence. Unique solution approaches (relative to the group) per submitter are virtually identical (0.58 and 0.59, in Intermediate and Final Disclosure.)

Further suggestion of convergent coordinated approaches comes from direct measures of concentration of solution submissions across approaches. The Herfindahl measure of concentration of shares is 52% higher in Intermediate Disclosure (0.149) than in Final Disclosure (0.0986).<sup>16</sup> Beyond being concentrated, submissions in Intermediate Disclosure were concentrated on just “high-potential” approaches. We rank ordered each of the 54 solution approaches in the entire experiment by their “potential,” based on the top score achieved within each approach and found that *every* solution in Intermediate Disclosure employed an approach that was above median.

### 6.3 Replication

Our experimental design minimized replication in order to maximize group size. Thus, we observe results in single trials of Intermediate Disclosure and Final Disclosure. This leaves the possibility that random eccentric outcomes or “butterfly effects” could have still somehow emerged and distorted population-level patterns in some way.<sup>17</sup> Some level of assurance already comes from results conforming closely to *a priori* reasoned theory and predictions. Further, despite single trials at the population level, we have considerable replication at the subject level, where there are no obvious signs of unduly influential or rogue outlier data points.

In addition, we sought a minimal level of added empirical validation by running a Mixed treatment (Section 4.2.1). This is not replication in the sense of running multiple trials of Intermediate and Final Disclosure. It is nonetheless a basis for assessing consistency of outcomes with a single separate empirical benchmark trial. Table 5 reports key summary statistics for the Mixed regime, relative to the main comparison groups. The results suggest considerable regularity of reported patterns (Table 5). In the case of each of the main statistics reported earlier—number of participants, number of submissions per participant, number of examinations of intermediate solutions, numbers of solutions generated and maximum score achieved—the Mixed regime falls between Intermediate and Final Disclosure regimes. The precise distribution of scores (beyond maximum scores), given by quantiles of final scores, is less regular. Broadly speaking, these comparisons demonstrate consider-

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<sup>16</sup>The Herfindahl measure of concentration is the sum of squared shares. Therefore, a higher Herfindahl measure indicates higher concentration. We calculate the share of submissions for each approach within each treatment by dividing the number of submissions using a particular solution approach, by the total number of submissions in the treatment.

<sup>17</sup>Single-trial comparisons (i.e., where a stream of outcomes resulting from one policy is compared to a stream of outcomes from another) remain the norm in the literatures making before-and-after or differences-in-differences comparisons on effects of innovation policies.

able regularity of results, providing no indication of eccentric outcomes driving the earlier reported patterns.

<Table 5>

## 7 Conclusion

This paper introduced an experimental framework for studying effects of disclosure policies on cumulative innovation, while contributing to a growing research interest in disclosures, transfers and “sharing” of knowledge and technology among innovators: “open innovation” of various sorts (e.g., West, 2003; von Hippel, 2005; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; von Krogh et al. 2003; Murray, et al. 2009; Boudreau 2010; Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Furman and Stern, 2011; Williams 2013). Our goal here being to distinguish effects of intermediate versus final disclosure policies.

This paper contributes to this growing body of work—by first by taking two steps back. The first step back we take is to observe that “open” innovation is hardly an isolated or exceptional phenomenon, if by “open” we mean that innovation takes place within a framework or system that deliberately enables transfers and reuse. We discussed and presented numerous examples (Table 1), to illustrate that the intended enablement of knowledge and technology transfers are a routine feature of most *every* innovation system—including those implemented by both public and private actors. This only stands to reason. Where innovators differ in their capabilities to recombine past innovations into new ones (and it is not always the originating upstream innovator who is superior in carrying this out) there will be innovative gains from transfers and reuse taking place. Designing (open) innovation systems therefore entails establishing frameworks in which productive transfers and exchanges—be they bilateral or multilateral—are feasibly implemented.

The second step back is to return to the longtime conception of the process of ongoing innovation as depending not just on transfers and reuse of knowledge and technologies *but also* on maintaining incentives (e.g., Romer, 1990; Green and Scotchmer, 1995). In this regard, this study departs from recent studies that focus on reuse and ongoing innovation patterns, without simultaneously considering how *ex post* reuse might affect *ex ante* incentives to develop the upstream innovation in the first place. We also depart from usual focus on a given institutional setting and innovation

system in favor of considering approaches that distinguish altogether different systems, following intermediate disclosure versus final disclosure policies. Thus, we consider effects of disclosure *prior to the work on an innovation even being completed* rather than optimal length of patents and other timing issues that have been studied in the past.

Our work is somewhat analogous to pioneering econometric studies of naturally occurring contexts examining *ex post* reuse, particularly focused on effects of patents on on-going innovation (e.g., Murray et al., 2009; Galasso and Schankermann, 2013; Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2014). As patents are, in principle and by design,<sup>18</sup> intended to ease reuse through assigning property rights (Kitch, 1977; Arora, et al. 2004), these patent citation studies can be interpreted as tests of the patent system’s ability to deliver on this goal. None has yet found evidence of accelerated reuse of an innovation subsequent to it being patented. The results are thus consistent with transaction cost impediments to disclosures and reuse with patents (e.g., Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) (presuming there are indeed gains from trade/transfers in the contexts studied)—rather than addressing fundamental differences across systems as we do here. Our theory is consistent with but does not particularly strongly rely on these results. In terms of methods, our direct comparison of independent experimental groups under different disclosure treatments is also analogous to the comparison of small numbers of cases with and without patents in these studies. However, rather than compare cases with and without patents or investigating any one innovation system, our study sought to better understand essential differences across intermediate and final disclosure systems, an essential difference across a wide range of innovation systems. (The patent system, for example, is but one example of a final disclosure system.) Our work is also somewhat related to studies by Stern and Furman (2011) and Boudreau (2010), which document cases in which attempts to deliberately accelerate *ex post* reuse indeed did so.

**Incentives-versus-Reuse and Patterns of “Search”.** We develop theory on intermediate versus final disclosure by drawing on insights from the economics of innovation (e.g., Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Murray, et al. 2009) and a distinct tradition considering innovation as a complex “search” process (e.g., Nelson, 1961; Simon, 1962; Levinthal, 1997; Fleming, 2001)—showing that *both* perspectives are required to understand the most important, first-order

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<sup>18</sup>Indeed, the word “patent” derives from Anglo-Norman “lettre patente,” meaning “open letter.”

determinants of innovation outcomes. A key starting point is our observation that intermediate disclosures reduce *contractibility* over transfers and reuse—where contractibility over innovations is already notoriously challenging under best of instances. Lost contractibility here refers specifically to the originating innovator’s ability to uphold stipulations of reuse, including assuring his payoffs and rewards. By the same token, intermediate disclosure leads to earlier, more frequent and potentially wider ranging disclosures, with fewer stipulations and restrictions on reuse. Under usual contracting conditions surrounding innovation, these conditions imply an incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, which was readily revealed in our experimental results. Intermediate disclosure led to 70% fewer solution submissions.

Apart from the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, our experimental analysis starkly revealed the importance of “search directions” and how systematic differences in choices of solution approaches across disclosure policies were essential to shaping innovation outcomes. Intermediate disclosures—if only by virtue of their timing—increase information and signaling in the innovation environment. As a result, choices of solution approaches across innovators are less independent, they are more “coordinated.” In our experiment, coordination of decisions led to convergence, with 30% fewer solution approaches tried by those working under intermediate disclosure.

**Comparative Advantages of Intermediate and Final Disclosure Policies.** The theoretical and experimental analysis should be understood as identifying simplest first-order tradeoffs and tensions created by different disclosure policies, necessarily abstracting from the many details of any one innovation system. The research design was particularly geared to documenting starker differences in innovation outcomes on the basis of uncomplicated cross-sectional comparisons and with a minimum of econometric manipulation. Although a great many questions remain, the results begin to suggest the outlines of a “division of labor” between intermediate and final disclosure approaches, while highlighting limitations and challenges of each.

In our setting, intermediate disclosure promoted efficient reuse, coordination and convergence on a globally optimal solution with less entry and effort (i.e., lower costs) and higher performance. However, more generally and in a “rugged” landscape of possible solutions, we might be concerned that intermediate disclosure encourages path dependence and lock into a suboptimal solution approach, or leads incentives to evaporate. Such systems might therefore benefit from offsetting features of

their design to countervail these weaknesses, as being directed—for example—to problems where the optimal solution approach is well known and wide experimentation is less useful and where returns to reuse are especially high. Alternatively, drawing on a wide and diverse pool of innovators less likely to fall into “groupthink” and to select on innovator types whose motivations are less dependent on contractibility of transfers and reuse. Inasmuch as intermediate disclosures imply smaller units of innovation output (e.g., edits, contributions, ideas, bug reports) many more individuals may be able to participate by making much smaller effort investments.

In theory and in our experiment, final disclosure promotes higher levels of entry and effort and independent experimentation. On the one hand, this generated wide diversity of approaches; on the other hand, this led to considerable effort devoted to suboptimal approaches and overall lesser learning and performance achieved. The overall empirical result of lower performance under final disclosure should hardly be regarded as general; tradeoffs should vary in importance according to the particularly prevailing structural conditions. Nonetheless, we might surmise that such systems might therefore also benefit from offsetting features of their design to countervail these weaknesses. This includes being devoted to conditions where wide diversity of experimentation is highly valued. Alternatively, if capabilities tend to concentrate and accumulate in individual innovators and there is little benefit from drawing on widely distributed contributions, then there may be higher returns to simply maximizing incentives of greatest experts, foregoing some degree of reuse.

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## TABLES

Table 1: Illustrative Examples of Cumulative Innovation Systems, by Disclosure Policy

Governance Framework	Unit of Innovation Output/Disclosure	Implementation of Incentives	Implementation of Disclosure & Reuse
<b>FINAL DISCLOSURE</b>			
Patent System	A working invention	Patents confer finite rights of exclusion, which in principle may enable property rights and trade or, alternatively, monopoly supply. (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1972; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen and Maskin, 2009)	Patent award leads to disclosure in the public domain with general public access once patent expires. Prior to this, licensing or imperfect protections enable disclosures and reuse. (e.g., Kitch, 1977; Jaffe, et al. 1992; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000; Arora et al., 2001; Chesbrough 2003; Williams, 2013)
Academic Science	A complete research publication.	Quality and number of publications are the basis of rewards in Science (promotion, status, funding, peer esteem honors and awards. Intrinsic motivation also plays a large role. (e.g., Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stern, 1994; Stephen, 1996; Aghion et al., 2008)	Publications are disclosed in the public domain (i.e., academic journals, working paper databases) whereupon others, conditional on citation, can reuse their content and ideas. (e.g., Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephen, 1996; Salter and Martin, 2001; Murray et al., 2009; Bikard, 2014)
Ansari X-Prize for Suborbital Space Flight (and other public contests)	A complete, working solution to the challenge	Cash payoffs and public acclaim are on the basis of rank-ordered outcomes based on preannounced criteria. (e.g., Taylor, 1995; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Boudreau, et al. 2011; Murray et al. 2012)	Disclosure in prizes may, in principle be dealt with any number of ways. In this case, ownership over the winning technology was retained by the winning solution provider. (e.g., Moser and Nicholas, 2013)
Apple AppStore (and other multi-sided platforms)	An “App”.	The platform creates two-sided market-based incentives to make sales to the large number of users of Apple devices. (e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2010; Boudreau, 2012)	The upstream platform is, by design, a technology intended to be reused and built upon. (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Boudreau, 2010; Parker and Van Alstyne. 2010)
<b>INTERMEDIATE DISCLOSURE</b>			
Open Source Projects (and other copyleft frameworks)	A code contribution, edit or bug report.	Projects enlist contributors with an intrinsic or own-use motivation, in addition to those wishing to learn, affiliate or signal their mastery through high quality contributions. (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Roberts et al., 2006)	GPL licenses (etc.) impose stringent requirements on those using and modifying code under GPL to mandatorily disclose and grant rights of access to others. (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lessig, 1999)
Human Genome Project (Bermuda Principles)	The gene sequence.	Public scientific institutions partaking in the HGP were required to accede to Bermuda principles as a condition of research funding. (e.g., Contreras, 2011)	The Bermuda Principles required public disclosure within 24 hours of discovery of sequence information. (e.g., Williams, 2013)
Homebrew Computer Club (and other collective invention, “user” and innovator communities)	The idea or technique.	Those drawn to participate in informal associations and communities of innovators may be motivated by wide range of reasons, including those related to learning, intrinsic motivation, socialization and many more. “Community” can also initiate an incentive to reciprocate. (e.g., von Hippel, 1988; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2003; Osterloh and Rota, 2007)	The typically informal nature of communities leads to few formal restrictions to disclosure and reuse. However, informal rules and norms and threat of sanction may be the basis for imposing conditions, such as acknowledgments. (e.g., Allen, 1983; Nuvolari, 2004 Fauchart and von Hippel, 2008)
Foldit Protein Folding Platform (and other aggregative, collaborative platforms)	The “fold” or “contribution”	The Foldit interface is devised “gamify” and entice an intrinsic puzzle-solving response of contributors. More generally, collaborative and aggregative platforms may mobilize effort through any number of incentive in collaborations. (Khatib, 2011; Zhang and Zhu, 2011; Franzoni and Sauermann, 2014)	The assembled database is available to scientist who study highest scoring solutions and who can then proceed to use these intermediate outputs as a basis for developing academic publications (See Table 1).

Table 2: Description of Variables

Variable	Unit of Observation	Description
Participation	Subject	An indicator variable switched on for all subjects submitting at least one solution.
Submissions	Subject	Count of the number of solutions submitted by a subject over the course of the two-week experiment.
No. Disclosures	Subject	Count of the number of past solutions for which the subject "clicked through" to see the complete code.
Submission Quality	Solution Submission	An automated precise measure of the quality of a each solution submission.
Programming Language	Solution Submission	A wide variety of programming languages were admissible. This field records the name of the language.
Solution Approach	Solution Submission	A 10-digit binary code describing which among 10 elemental techniques are used in a given solution submission.

Note. The data set relates to 733 subjects, of which 122 are submitters, submitting 654 solutions.

Table 3: Elemental Techniques Used in Solutions

Method	Description
1	<b>Filtering by ungapped alignment score (Hamming distance):</b> Compare the query string against strings from sets A, B and/or C, trying various possible offsets.
2	<b>Filtering by comparing frequencies of hashed chunks:</b> For both the query string and strings from A, B and/or C, move a sliding window across the string and make a frequency table of the chunks that appear in the window, optionally after hashing the chunks. Select the best match(es) between the frequency table obtained from the query and those from the corpus.
3	<b>Dynamic programming:</b> Compute the actual Levenshtein distance between a portion of the query and strings from sets A, B and/or C.
4	<b>Dynamic programming extended to more than one section (A, B, C) at once:</b> Extend the dynamic programming Levenshtein distance computation to find the optimal edit distance between (a portion of) the query and all possible A+B, B+C or A+B+C combinations.
5	<b>Bit optimizations:</b> Use bitwise arithmetic to operate on multiple characters at a time.
6	<b>SSE optimizations:</b> Use Streaming SIMD Extensions (a CPU instruction set enabling single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) parallelization) to process up to 16 characters or strings at once.
7	<b>Refinement of choices after finding initial solution:</b> As a post-processing step, hold two of the three selections fixed and reoptimize the third.
8	<b>Fast approximation of edit distance in well-matched regions:</b> Use restricted dynamic programming, Hamming distance or variants thereof to speed up the computation.
9	<b>Precomputation of statistics on the string corpus:</b> Perform offline analysis of the provided sets A, B and C, and use the data obtained for decision making in the algorithm.
10	<b>Explicitly prefer shorter B strings:</b> In heuristic approaches, give bonuses to shorter strings from set B (which empirically have greater likelihood of producing high scores).

Table 4: Overview of Differences in Outcomes across Final Disclosure and Intermediate Disclosure

	FINAL DISCLOSURE		INTERMEDIATE DISCLOSURE	
	mean	s.e.	mean	s.e.
No. Subjects Assigned:	245		244	
<b>"Entry", Participation and Effort</b>				
No. Active Participants / Submitters	46		33	
Prob{Submitting}	.19	(.01)	.14	(.01)
No. Submissions	319		99	
Submissions / Active Participant	6.93	(.42)	3.00	(.14)
<b>Examinations of Intermediate Solutions</b>				
No. Examinations of Intermediate Solutions	n/a		1359	
No. Examinations by Submitters			1024	
No. Submitters Examining			30	
Prob{Submitter Examining}			.91	(.01)
No. Solutions Examined per Examining Submitter			34.13	(1.79)
No. Examinations by Non-Submitters			335	
No. Non-Submitters Examining			46	
Prob{Non-Submitter Examining}			.22	(.01)
No. Solutions Examined per Examining Non-Submitter			7.28	(.5)
<b>Solution Approaches</b>				
No. Solution Approaches	27		19	
Unique (to Submitter) Approaches per Submitter	1.96	(.07)	1.67	(.06)
Unique (to Group) Approaches per Submitter	.59	(.07)	.58	(.06)
Unique Approaches per Submission	.08	(.00)	.19	(.01)
<b>Problem-Solving Performance [Final Scores]</b>				
Max	71		100	
q90	47		94	
q75	24		38	
Median	13		11	
q25	5		5	
q10	5		2	
Min	0		0	

Table 5: Regularity of Results in Relation to Mixed Comparison Group

	FINAL DISCLOSURE mean	MIXED COMPARISON GROUP mean	INTERMEDIATE DISCLOSURE mean
No. Subjects Assigned	245	244	244
No. Active Participants	46	43	33
No. Submissions	319	236	99
No. Examinations	0	654	1359
No. Solution Approaches	27	25	19
Problem-Solving Performance			
Max	71	83	100
q90	47	61	94
q75	24	39	38
Median	13	24	11
q25	5	4	5
q10	5	5	2
Min	0	0	0

## FIGURES

Figure 1: Overview of Experimental Sequence





Figure 2: Overview of Solution Submissions over Time, by Disclosure Policy (submissions, fitted mean and maximal envelope shown)



Note. Submissions shown along with upper maximal envelope and a fitted mean (nonparametric, locally-weighted second-order polynomial).

Figure 3: Subjects' Performance Trajectories (highlighting first through fifth ranked)




Figure 4: Solutions by Approach (i.e., Unique Combination of Techniques)

